Unsafe Speed to Reversible Error

Unsafe Speed to Reversible Error
By Jack A. Fleischli, Esq.

Judgment on Appeal Adams

On Tuesday, April 18, 2011, in the City of Irvine, California, at 4:55 p.m.,18-year old Spencer Scott Adams drove a BMW down University Avenue approaching Rosa Drew and Ridgeline streets. The posted speed was 50 miles per hour. Irvine Police Department, Motor Officer G. Gales , I.D. No. 444, activated a hand-held Lidar device (essentially, the laser equivalent of radar) and thereafter proceeded to issue Adams a citation for an alleged violation of California Vehicle Code Section 22350, Unsafe Speed. The Citation indicates that the road conditions were dry, the traffic was light and the weather was clear. The face of the Citation indicated that the “Safe” speed was 50 and that Adams’ “Speed Approx.” was “70.”
A court trial in the matter commenced on September 1, 2011 in the Department H14 of the Harbor Justice Center, Orange County Superior Court, the Honorable Sue Braswell, Judge Pro Tem Presiding. Defendant Adams was represented at trial (and later, on appeal) by Attorney Jack A. Fleischli. When Officer Gales attempted to testify as to the lidar results, defense objections were repeatedly made, and rulings from the Court repeatedly requested, as to lack of foundation of an appropriate traffic and engineering survey to support the posted speed limit and as to certain calibration and training prerequisites for the admission of lidar evidence. In virtually every instance of defense objections, the objections were overruled by the Court. In regards to the traffic surveys (two different surveys, as discussed below), the Court purported to take “Judicial Notice” of such reports which were supposedly somewhere in the Courthouse, albeit elsewhere than Department H14 during the trial. Nevertheless, Officer Gales elected not to testify directly as to the lidar speed reading (and in fact never testified as to the actual speed reading from his lidar device, nor even as to any “visual estimate” of defendant’s speed ), but instead testified simply – and with no particular explication as to how he arrived at this conclusion — that from his observation of defendant’s driving on University Avenue, defendant’s speed was unsafe, in violation of CVC Section 22350 . This testimony was objected to as lacking foundation, as a legal conclusion and as incompetent unless and until the foundation for the lidar use was established at trial, but these objections too were overruled by the Court.

In fact, there were two engineering and traffic surveys pertinent to this stretch of roadway. The first was just over five years old on the date of the Citation and this survey (flawed in many respects concerning the statutory requirements for a lawful traffic survey) stated that the 85% speed was approximately 50 miles per hour. The second such survey was very recent and stated that the 85% speed was approximately 55 miles per hour. The newer survey was so recent in fact that the new speed limit which was recommended in the survey – 55 miles per hour – had not been implemented as of the date of the Citation. Certified copies of neither of the surveys were brought to Court by Officer Gales but the Court purported to admit each into evidence through the use of the Judicial Notice gambit which I consider in these matters to be, in effect, the Phantom Document Gambit.

Here’s the Phantom Document Gambit works in practice: The officer brings in nothing or a piece of paper that purports to be a copy of a Certified Copy of an otherwise qualified traffic and engineering survey and begins to testify about a radar or lidar or unsafe speed result. If defendant does not object, the issue of the foundation for that otherwise incompetent testimony never arises. If defendant objects, the officer holds up the copy of the copy. If defendant does not object, the issue passes. If defendant objects as to certification that this copy is an actual copy of an actual Certified Copy of the pertinent record, the Court volunteers to have the Court take “Judicial Notice” of the purported “actual” Certified Copy” of the pertinent survey. If defendant does not object, the issue passes. Also, the issue passes if the Court simply does not rule on any such objections, since on appeal this will probably be deemed a waiver by defendant for not receiving a ruling on the given objection. If defendant objects to the Court taking Judicial Notice of the purported Certified Copy of the survey, then the Court simply says that the survey is “on file” (somewhere, but typically not in the Courtroom) in the Courthouse. The case proceeds, the evidence of speed is admitted and your client is, commonly, convicted.

Officer Gales further testified that University Avenue in this location had been the site of numerous traffic accidents over the years. Officer Gales then added that Adams volunteered to him when receiving the citation that he (Adams) was rushing home to turn in a college assignment. This testimony was, in turn, objected to by the defense as lacking the foundation of corpus delicti and the objection was overruled. A motion for a directed verdict of Not Guilty was made by counsel for Adams at the close of the prosecution case, and this motion was denied by the Court. Defendant Adams (who was not present for the trial) did not testify in his defense. Officer Gales was asked some additional questions in the defense case concerning the stop and he then noted that he had stated to defendant while issuing the citation that Adams had been traveling at “freeway speeds” during the incident and that defendant Adams needed to slow down.

At the conclusion of the trial, counsel for defendant argued that evidence of unsafe speed was incompetent and insufficient as a matter of law, that no corpus delicti foundation had been established as to defendant’s purported admission of “rushing home,” that driving a “freeway speeds” is not an incriminating statement insofar as many vehicles travel at 50 miles per hour or less on various freeways in California, and that at any event the evidence of unsafe speed was insufficient as a matter of law. The Court issued a Judgment of Guilty and Adams thereafter timely filed a Notice of Appeal. On January 9, 2012, appellant filed his 26-page APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF .

On appeal, in this case, no prosecutorial agency filed any opposition whatsoever to appellant’s appeal. No representative of the People showed up for oral argument on April 26, 2012 in Department C01 of the Orange County Superior Court, Central District, Honorable Geoffrey T. Glass, Judge Presiding. Attorney Fleischli appeared at oral argument for appellant and highlighted to the Court that the evidence of unsafe speed was insufficient as a matter of law, that all of the evidence of unsafe speed was, moreover, incompetent as lacking foundation as set forth in Appellant’s Opening Brief, and that the most recent pertinent traffic survey did not, in any event, support the posted speed limit of 50 miles per hour.

On May 9, 2012, Judge Glass issued the Superior Court’s opinion in a JUDGMENT ON APPEAL. The full, three-page NOTICE OF FILING OF JUDGMENT/ORDER and associated JUDGMENT ON APPEAL… is attached to this article. In summary, however, Judge Glass reversed the trial court’s judgment with direction that the charge be dismissed. In support of the reversal, Judge Glass held that:

1. There was no evidence of the speed at which appellant was driving at the time of the Citation;
2. The citing officer’s testimony did not adequately establish that appellant’s unspecified speed was unsafe in light of conditions existing at the time;
3. The September 2010 survey (the second of the two surveys admitted into evidence at trial) only justified a posted speed limit of 55 miles per hour, not the 50 miles per hour limit in effect at the time of the Citation;
4. The officer did not establish full compliance with the foundational requirements of California Vehicle Code Section 40802(c) as would be required for the August 2005 survey (the earlier of the two surveys) to have been properly admissible in evidence; and, significantly,
5. The Court further ruled,
“In addition, the trial court’s apparent practice of maintaining the survey in the courtroom and making it available to facilitate the conviction of defendants such as appellant, who might otherwise obtain favorable judgments under the speed trap laws, creates an appearance of partiality and impropriety. Further, maintaining the survey requires the court to lay foundation for its admission, which is the obligation of the prosecution.” (JUDGMENT ON APPEAL…, p. 1, ln. 28 and p. 2, lns. 1-7; bold added)

Concluding observations from Counsel for Defendant/Appellant

In reflection on this case: This case presents a virtual textbook example of the prosecutorial pitfalls and defense opportunities for successfully defending an unsafe speed or speeding prosecution in which the citing officer utilized lidar or radar in the case leading to issuing the citation. In order to win or to create an adequate record for an eventual appeal, it is essential to not only make the appropriate objections and associated motions to strike, but also to insist upon rulings by the trial court on those posed objections and motions. It always makes sense to make a discovery request in these cases to determine what calibration records, officer training records and traffic survey records may be pertinent to the case. Also, it may behoove you and your client to independently check the specific city records for the most recent traffic and engineering survey. Finally, the process of the Court sua sponte or otherwise taking Judicial Notice of traffic surveys inside the courtroom or elsewhere in the Courthouse should be vigorously resisted by defense counsel.

Jack A. Fleischli was admitted to the California Bar in December 1975 and served as a Deputy Public Defender for the County of Orange, California from December 1975 through mid-1981 when he started his private practice of law. His law office is located in Long Beach, California and he can be contacted for further information at: hotshotattorney@gmail.com

Automatic Restraining Orders in Family Law Summons

Application of Automatic Restraining Orders in Family Law Summons

Necessities of Life

The situation is one party uses community funds for the necessities of life and to pay legal fees. The other party in essence wants reimbursement to the community for these funds.  

The demand for reimbursement is based on the automatic standard restraining orders of Family Code § 2040(a)(2) that bar either party from:  “. . .  from transferring, encumbering, hypothecating, concealing, or disposing of any property, real or personal, whether community, quasi-community, or separate, without the other party’s written consent or a court order. . .”

But Family Code § 2040(a)(2) has an exception which specifically states: “except in the usual course of business or for the necessities of life.” “Read literally, the restraining orders forbid a divorcing spouse from even buying groceries (“you and your spouse are restrained from … transferring … or in any way disposing of any property, real or personal ….”) unless one reads further and realizes the blanket preclusion is qualified for disposals of property either in the “usual course of business or for the necessities of life.” Besides being a matter of common sense, these qualifiers are mandated by a formidable body of constitutional law precluding the summary deprivation of property without due process, i.e., without notice and hearing. That law was forged in the context of overreaching creditor’s remedies in which alleged debtors found themselves summarily deprived of the use of their property without deliberative court proceedings. (See Randone v. Appellate Department (1971) 5 Cal.3d 536 [96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13] [prejudgment attachment procedure unconstitutional without notice and hearing]; Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258 [96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 486 P.2d 1242] [same for claim and delivery]; see also Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. (1969) 395 U.S. 337 [23 L. Ed. 2d 349, 89 S. Ct. 1820] [summary attachments without notice and hearing unconstitutional].)” Gale v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1393

Contrast the clearly stated exceptions to the ATROs with the marriage of McTiernan, where the sale of stock was held a violation of the ATROs. Specifically: “In April 1998, faced with a cash shortage, husband sold certain community property stocks, the proceeds of which he used in part to pay community expenses. Husband did not inform wife or seek court approval of the stock sale before conducting it.” In re Marriage of McTiernan & Dubrow (2005)133 Cal.App.4th 1090, 1103

The McTiernan court did not specify what the proceeds from the sale of stock were used for except in part to pay community expenses. The McTiernan court did not state the proceeds were used for the necessities of life or legal fees. In fact during the eight and three-quarter years of marriage before separation, husband had earned approximately $15 million. Most likely the sale proceeds were not used for necessities of life or legal fees.

In absence of a statement of facts the sales proceeds were used for necessities of life and/or legal fees, should the McTiernan case apply to expenditures for the necessities of life? The “tentative ruling” of the court is the community should be reimbursed.

 

Application of Automatic Restraining Orders in Family Law Summons for Attorney Fees

California Family Code Section 2040(a) (2) allows the payment of attorney fees. “Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing in the restraining order shall preclude a party from using community property, quasi-community property, or the party’s own separate property to pay reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in order to retain legal counsel in the proceeding. A party who uses community property or quasi-community property to pay his or her attorney’s retainer for fees and costs under this provision shall account to the community for the use of the property.”

Should a person be allowed to use community funds to pay for dissolution of marriage without reimbursing the community for those funds? The “tentative ruling” of the court is the community should be reimbursed.

Community Property Interest Created in Separate Property

Community Property Interest Created in Separate Property due to Principal Pay Down

Presumption on Community Credit

“There is a rebuttable presumption that property acquired on credit during marriage is community property. [Citations] But “funds procured by the hypothecation of separate property of a spouse are separate property of that spouse.” [Citations] The proceeds of a loan made on the credit of separate property are governed by the same rule. [Citations]] In accordance with this general principle, the character of property acquired by a sale upon credit is determined according to the intent of the seller to rely upon the separate property of the purchaser or upon a community asset. [Citations]] In the absence of evidence tending to prove that the seller primarily relied upon the purchaser’s separate property in extending credit, the trial court must find in accordance with the presumption.” Gudelj v. Gudelj, (1953) 41 Cal.2d 202, 211

What is the amount of the community interest?

Moore cited Aufmuth as the authority for parsing out the community interest. It is basically the reduction of principal and does not allow for reimbursement for property taxes, interest or insurance. “Although many formulae have been suggested, we are not persuaded that any of them would be an improvement over a formula based on the reasoning of In re Marriage of Aufmuth (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 446, which was approved In re Marriage of Lucas (1980) 27 Cal.3d 808. We were there concerned with determining the respective community and separate interests in a residence purchased during marriage with a combination of community and separate funds where the community contributed the loan and subsequent payments on it and there was an agreement or understanding that the party contributing the separate property down payment was to retain a pro rata separate property interest. The formula we used there recognized the economic value of the loan taken to purchase the property. In the formula postulated in Lucas the proceeds of the loan were treated as a community property contribution on the assumption that the loan was made on the strength of the community assets” In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 374

Marriage of Aufmuth Formula

The Aufmuth court’s opinion stated: “It was stipulated that the home had a fair market value of $125,000, an increase in value of $58,500 over the original $66,500 purchase price. The mortgage balance at the date of separation was $47,000. The community contributed $50,000, and wife contributed $16,500 of her separate funds, to the original purchase price. The community interest in the property was therefore 75.19 percent ($50,000 divided by $66,500), and the remaining 24.81 percent interest was wife’s separate property, when the residence was acquired.

In accordance with this formula, the trial court found that “the present value of the $16,500 initial investment in said residence is $31,014 and the present value of the joint investment is $46,986.” Although not expressly stated, it is apparent that the court calculated the $ 31,014 figure by adding the amount of capital appreciation attributable to separate funds (24.81 percent of $58,500) to the amount of the equity paid by separate funds ($16,500); the $46,986 figure, by adding the amount of capital appreciation attributable to community funds (75.19 percent of $58,500) to the amount of equity paid by community funds ($50,000 minus $47,000).” In re Marriage of Aufmuth (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 446, 458

Unaccredited Law Schools

Unaccredited Law Schools

Source – State Bar of California at http://admissions.calbar.ca.gov/Education/LegalEducation.aspx

Unaccredited correspondence law schools. A correspondence law school is a law school that conducts instruction principally by correspondence. A correspondence law school must require at least 864 hours of preparation and study per year for four years.

Unaccredited distance-learning law schools. A distance-learning law school is a law school that conducts instruction and provides interactive classes principally by technological means. A distance-learning law school must require at least 864 hours of preparation and study per year for four years.

Unaccredited fixed-facility law schools. A fixed-facility law school is a law school that conducts its instruction principally in physical classroom facilities. A fixed-facility law school must require classroom attendance of its students for a minimum of 270 hours a year for four years.

To be eligible to take the California Bar Examination, one must have completed at least two years of college before beginning the study of law or must have passed certain specified College Level Equivalency Program examinations before beginning law study and must have graduated from a law school approved by the American Bar Association or accredited by the Committee of Bar Examiners of The State Bar of California or have completed four years of law study at an unaccredited or correspondence law school registered with the Committee or studied law in a law office or judge’s chambers in accordance with the Rules Regulating Admission to Practice Law in California.

Those studying law who did not successfully complete their first year of law study at a school approved by the American Bar Association or accredited by the Committee must take the First-Year Law Students’ Examination upon completion of their first year of law study. They must pass the examination within three administrations of first becoming eligible to take it in order to receive credit for law study accomplished up to the time of passage. If they pass the examination on their fourth or more attempt, they will receive credit for only one year of law study.”

ABA Law Schools

Law Schools Accredited by the American Bar Association (ABA)
Source – State Bar of California at http://admissions.calbar.ca.gov/Education/LegalEducation/LawSchools.aspx

California Western School of Law

  • 225 Cedar Street
  • San Diego, CA 92101-3046
  • (619) 239-0391
  • www.cwsl.edu

University of California at Davis School of Law (King Hall)

  • 400 Mrak Hall Drive
  • Davis, CA 95616-5201
  • (530) 752-0243
  • www.law.ucdavis.edu  

Chapman University School of Law

  • 370 North Glassell Street
  • Orange, CA 92866-1032
  • (888) 242-1913
  • (714) 628-2500
  • www.chapman.edu/law

University of California at Irvine, School of Law

  • 401 E. Peltason Drive, Suite 1000
  • Irvine, CA 92697-8000
  • (949) 824-0066
  • www.law.uci.edu  

Golden Gate University School of Law

University of California at Los Angeles

  • School of Law
  • P.O. Box 951476
  • Los Angeles, CA  90095-1476
  • (310) 825-4841
  • www.law.uci.edu  

Loyola Law School

  • 919 S. Albany Street
  • Los Angeles, CA 90015-1211
  • (213) 736-1000
  • www.lls.edu University of California

Hastings College of the Law

  • 200 McAllister Street
  • San Francisco, CA 94102-4707
  • (415) 565-4600
  • www.uchastings.edu

Pepperdine University School of Law

University of San Diego, School of Law

  • 5998 Alcalá Park
  • San Diego, CA 92110-2492
  • (619) 260-4600
  • www.sandiego.edu/usdlaw

Santa Clara University School of Law

  • 500 El Camino Real
  • Santa Clara, CA 95053-0001
  • (408) 554-4800
  • www.scu.edu/law
  •  

University of San Francisco, School of Law

  • 2130 Fulton Street
  • San Francisco, CA 94117
  • (415) 422-6586
  • www.usfca.edu/law  

Southwestern Law School

  • 3050 Wilshire Boulevard
  • Los Angeles, CA 90010-1106
  • (213) 738-6700
  • www.swlaw.edu

University of Southern California, Gould School of Law

  • University Park
  • Los Angeles, CA 90089-0071
  • (213) 740-2523
  • www.usc.edu/dept/law

Stanford Law School

  • 559 Nathan Abbott Way
  • Stanford, CA 94305-8610
  • (650) 723-2465
  • www.law.stanford.edu University of the Pacific

McGeorge School of Law

  • 3200 Fifth Avenue
  • Sacramento, CA 95817-2705
  • (916) 739-7191
  • www.mcgeorge.edu

Thomas Jefferson School of Law

  • 1155 Island Avenue
  • San Diego, CA 92101
  • (619) 297-9700
  • www.tjsl.edu

Western State University

  • College of Law
  • 1111 North State College Blvd.
  • Fullerton, CA 92831-3014
  • (714) 738-1000
  • www.wsulaw.edu

University of California at Berkeley

  • Boalt Hall School of Law
  • 270 Simon Hall
  • Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
  • (510) 642-2274
  • www.law.berkeley.edu

Whittier Law School

  • 3333 Harbor Blvd.
  • Costa Mesa, CA 92626-1501
  • (714) 444-4141
  • www.law.whittier.edu

Trade Marks and Service Marks

Trade Marks and Service Marks

If you use a slogan or logo, consider registering your company’s marks, both to protect your investment in the mark and to prevent unintentional violations of marks of other businesses. A trademark is either a word, phrase, symbol or design, or combination of words, phrases, symbols or designs which identifies and distinguishes the source of the goods or services of one party from those of others. A service mark is the same as a trademark except that it identifies and distinguishes the source of a service rather than a product.

Generally, the first party who uses a mark in commerce has the ultimate right to register a mark. Registration in California is effective for 10 years, renewable for another 10 years, and there is no limitation on the number of renewals. Registration with the state of California serves as prima facie evidence of ownership of such mark as applied to the goods or services and it is constructive notice of the registrant = s claim of ownership.

In addition to establishing the right of use, a registered mark acts as a shield against potential law suits and protects the owner of the mark from others who have concurrent or prior use of a similar mark. Any owner of a mark registered may proceed by suit to enjoin the manufacture, use, display or sale of any counterfeits. California law provides that any court of competent jurisdiction may grant injunctions and shall require the defendants to pay to the owner up to three times their profits from and up to three times all damages suffered by reason of the wrongful manufacture, use, display, or sale of a registered mark.

You can also obtain national protection by registration with the US Patent and Trademark Office. A U.S. registration requires that the product or service behind the mark be placed in interstate or international commerce. Use of a mark in purely local commerce within a state does not qualify as interstate commerce. An applicant may apply for federal registration in two principal ways: (1) An applicant who has already commenced using a mark in commerce may file based on that use (a @ use @ application). Advertising without actually providing the product or service will not qualify as a A use @ application. (2) An applicant who has not yet used the mark may apply based on a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce (an A intent-to-use @ application).

Child Custody Basics

Author:  Mark W. Bidwell, www.BidwellLaw.com

In child custody for the average parent, the following guidelines may provide you insight into how child custody could be ordered by a court.

Public Policy is Frequent and Continuing Contact. Family Code 3020(b) “The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state to assure that children have frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage, or ended their relationship, and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this policy.”

Joint Physical Custody Family Code 3004. “Joint physical custody” means that each of the parents shall have significant periods of physical custody. Joint physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way so as to assure a child of frequent and continuing contact with both parents.

No Gender Preference Family Code 3040(a) “The court may not prefer a parent as custodial parent because of that parent’s gender.”

Child’s Preference Family Code 3042. (a) “If a child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to custody, the court shall consider and give due weight to the wishes of the child in making an order granting or modifying custody. The court may preclude the calling of the child as a witness where the best interests of the child so dictate and may provide alternative means of obtaining information regarding the child’s preferences.”

Maturity Is Not Measured By Chronological Age. “The mediator gave her opinion that both children were very mature. The court had an opportunity to personally observe the children and judge their sincerity, bearing and degree of maturity, while questioning them in chambers. With children 10 and 13 years of age we believe it is peculiarly the function of the trial judge to determine what consideration is to be given, if any, to their expressed preference as to custody.” Marriage of Rosson (1986) 178 CA3d 1094, 1103.

Child Custody Terminology

3002. “Joint custody” means joint physical custody and joint legal custody.

3003 . “Joint legal custody” means that both parents shall share the right and the responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health, education, and welfare of a child.

3004. “Joint physical custody” means that each of the parents shall have significant periods of physical custody. Joint physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way so as to assure a child of frequent and continuing contact with both parents.

3006. “Sole legal custody” means that one parent shall have the right and the responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health, education, and welfare of a child.

3007. “Sole physical custody” means that a child shall reside with and be under the supervision of one parent, subject to the power of the court to order visitation.

Child Support Under California Family Law

In implementing the statewide uniform guideline, the courts shall adhere to the following principles:

(a) A parent’s first and principal obligation is to support his or her minor children according to the parent’s circumstances and station in life.
(b) Both parents are mutually responsible for the support of their children.
(c) The guideline takes into account each parent’s actual income and level of responsibility for the children.
(d) Each parent should pay for the support of the children according to his or her ability.
(e) The guideline seeks to place the interests of children as the state’s top priority.
(f) Children should share in the standard of living of both parents. Child support may therefore appropriately improve the standard of living of the custodial household to improve the lives of the children.
(g) Child support orders in cases in which both parents have high levels of responsibility for the children should reflect the increased costs of raising the children in two homes and should minimize significant disparities in the children’s living standards in the two homes.
(h) The financial needs of the children should be met through private financial resources as much as possible.
(i) It is presumed that a parent having primary physical responsibility for the children contributes a significant portion of available resources for the support of the children.
(j) The guideline seeks to encourage fair and efficient settlements of conflicts between parents and seeks to minimize the need for litigation.
(k) The guideline is intended to be presumptively correct in all cases, and only under special circumstances should child support orders fall below the child support mandated by the guideline formula.
(l) Child support orders must ensure that children actually receive fair, timely, and sufficient support reflecting the state’s high standard of living and high costs of raising children compared to other states.

Here is the statewide uniform guideline for determining child support orders.

CS = K (HN ‑ (H%) (TN)).

The components of the formula are as follows:

CS = child support amount.

K = amount of both parents’ income to be allocated for child support as set forth below.
K (amount of both parents’ income allocated for child support) equals one plus H% (if H% is less than or equal to 50 percent) or two minus H% (if H% is greater than 50 percent) times the following fraction:

_ _ Total Net Disposable
_ _ Income Per Month (K)
_ _ $0‑800 0.20 + TN/16,000
_ _ $801‑6,666 0.25
_ _ $6,667‑10,000 0.10 + 1,000/TN
_ _ Over $10,000 0.12 + 800/TN

For example, if H% equals 20 percent and the total monthly net disposable income of the parents is $1,000, K = (1 + 0.20) X 0.25, or 0.30. If H% equals 80 percent and the total monthly net disposable income of the parents is $1,000, K = (2 ‑ 0.80) X 0.25, or 0.30.

HN = high earner’s net monthly disposable income.

H% = approximate percentage of time that the high earner has or will have primary physical responsibility for the children compared to the other parent. _ In cases in which parents have different time‑sharing arrangements for different children, H% equals the average of the approximate percentages of time the high earner parent spends with each child.

TN = total net monthly disposable income of both parties.

For more than one child, multiply CS by:
_ 2 children _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1.6
_ 3 children _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2
_ 4 children _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2.3
_ 5 children _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2.5
_ 6 children _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2.625
_ 7 children _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2.75
_ 8 children _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2.813
_ 9 children _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2.844
_ 10 children _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2.86

General Characteristics of a Corporation

Separate existence. A corporation through legal fiction has it own legal existence and with that existence come economic rights. Some of those rights are: the right too enter into a contract; due process protection of corporate assets against state and federal government takings; freedom of commercial speech in the form of advertisements; and equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. A corporation does not have individual rights such as: the 5th amendment right to protection against self incrimination, the 4th amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure or the 1st amendment protection of political free speech. Because of this separate existence created by legal fiction, a corporation can exist beyond the lives of it’s shareholders.

Centralized management. Corporate law provides an organizational structure to operate the business and the capital of many individuals. The basic structure is as follows. Shareholders are the owners of the corporation, directors are elected by the shareholders and are the locus of power. Directors appoint the corporate officers. Directors approve policy and procedures of the operations of the corporation. Corporate officers carry on the day to day activities of the corporation and serve at the pleasure of the board of directors.

Transferability of ownership interest. The issuance of shares creates a kind of currency in with value based on the assets owned by the corporation or the financial performance of the corporation. Shares facilitate transferability of ownership. This enhances the marketability of the entity and allows for an exit strategy for the owners.

Limited liability. A corporation shields its owners from personal liability for the debt of the corporation.

Author:Mark W. Bidwell

Advantages of a Corporation

Advantage of a Corporation over a Sole Proprietor or Individual

Transferrability of Ownership Interest

The issuance of shares creates a kind of currency in with value based on the assets owned by the corporation or the financial performance of the corporation. Shares facilitate transferability of ownership. This enhances the marketability of the entity and allows for an exit strategy for the owners. Exit strategy is also known as succession planning.

Creditor Protection

A corporation shields its owners from personal liability for the debt of the corporation. It is important to understand protection is only from corporate debts and not personal debts of the owner.

Cities served by Newport Harbor Bar Association

Cities covered

  • Anaheim
  • Cypress
  • Costa Mesa
  • Fountain Valley
  • Garden Grove
  • Huntington Beach
  • Irvine
  • La Brea
  • Lake Forest
  • Los Alamitos
  • Laguna Beach
  • Laguna Woods
  • Laguna Hills
  • La Habra
  • Midway City
  • Newport Beach
  • Newport Coast
  • Orange
  • Rossmoor
  • Santa Ana
  • Seal Beach
  • Stanton
  • Sunset Beach
  • Surfside
  • Tustin
  • Westminster